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Comparative research suggests that government interventions sup-porting women’s rights can reduce gender inequalities in propertydistribution. (1) Similarly, ceteris paribus, markets are less gender dis-
criminatory in distributing assets than kinship and marriage institutions. (2)
In light of this research, the gender asset gap in contemporary China is
puzzling. In the mid-twentieth century, China’s new socialist government
wiped the slate clean when it came to the unequal distribution of productive
assets. Women were recruited as participants in, and explicitly nominated
as equal beneficiaries of, the redistribution and subsequent socialisation of
rural land and urban enterprises. Their equal rights to inheritance, individual
and marital property, and collective and public goods were guaranteed in
legislation and policies, publicised in mass media and cultural performances,
and enforced by courts. Increased investments in education dramatically
improved gender equality in schooling. Women achieved one of the highest
rates of labour force participation in the world. Fertility reduction meant
that, at least in many urban families, daughters became their parents’ sole
beneficiaries. And the post-Mao expansion of markets and privatisation of
many state and collective enterprises and housing removed barriers to
women’s purchase of property.
Yet China’s women own far less than men. Rural women own least of all.
But even in urban areas, women own less housing, business, and financial
wealth, and fewer cars and major durable goods. (3) Moreover, during the
first decade of the twenty-first century, the period on which this paper fo-
cuses, the gender asset gap grew wider. Indeed, as the amount of wealth in
the economy grows, so too does the size of that asset gap. Nowhere is this
gap more apparent, or its consequences for women’s future capacities more
serious, than around the margins of expanding cities where the conversion
of farmland for urban development has sent property values skyrocketing.
Nevertheless, the growth of gender asset inequalities in urbanising areas
has been largely overlooked in both policy and scholarly studies. A recent
World Bank publication examining the consequences of urbanisation in
China, for example, fails to notice whether urban expansion affects gender
property distribution. (4)
This article explores how the gender asset gap is being reproduced in the
course of rural China’s urban transformation. It queries the plausibility of the
most common explanations for this gap, and suggests that Charles Tilly’s
theory of categorical sources of “durable inequality” offers a useful corrective
to those explanations. (5) In contrast to the most common explanations, Tilly’s
theory would lead us to anticipate that gender inequalities will endure as
long as gender is enforced organisationally, institutionally, and ideologically,
as a set of binary categories between which transactions repeatedly benefit
one category. While the paper points to the effects of ideology, it primarily
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focuses on how organisations utilise gender categories to naturalise unequal
asset distribution between men and women in urbanising areas of China.
The exploration is presented in five sections. The first section defines and
explains why asset inequalities matter more in the context of urbanisation.
Section two surveys evidence of the gender asset gap in rural areas. The
third section examines three widely-accepted narratives explaining gender
inequalities. Analysis of these narratives is relevant for two reasons: first, it
helps elucidate reasons for contemporary asset distributions; second,
matched against available empirical evidence, the analysis is a useful test
of the explanatory power of the narratives themselves. It will be shown that
although these explanations do yield important insights into sources of gen-
der inequality, each also fails to account for the reproduction of the gender
asset gap in the context of urbanisation. A case is then made that Tilly’s
theory provides a more robust account of why the asset gap persists. In the
fourth section, I draw on data collected from a total of 280 interviewees
and 1,050 survey respondents during field trips to peri-urban sites in Zhe-
jiang, Fujian, Hunan, and Yunnan provinces between 2004 and 2012 (6) to il-
lustrate how, when villagers are compensated for the expropriation of their
land and demolition of their agricultural and business activities and housing,
Village Committees, households, and local government authorities utilise
gender categories to resolve distributional problems, and differentially com-
pensate men. Women become less likely than men to be acknowledged as,
and have the capacity to fully act as, the owners, managers, and users of
the assets whose value increases as a result of urbanisation. Instead, women
are reincorporated into the urban economy as workers in, domestic care-
takers of, and dependents on assets owned by the state and male-headed
businesses and households. The final section concludes that unless govern-
ment intervenes to reduce the gender asset gap, gender inequalities will in-
tensify in the course of rural China’s urban transformation.
Why the gender asset gap matters in
urbanising China
As most studies of gender inequalities in China’s economy focus on labour
markets and incomes, before surveying the asset gap it is worth clarifying
the core concepts under discussion and explaining why the gender asset
gap should matter to anyone trying to understand how women will fare in
China’s urban future. Assets include both tangible and intangible goods. Fol-
lowing conventional usage, institutions are conceived to include the whole
panoply of laws, rules, policies, kinship structures, marital regimes, cultural
values, and customary practices that normatively define conditions for peo-
ple’s interactions and behaviour with regard to assets.
Some scholars argue that, compared to income, during the course of in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation assets serve as a more holistic and reliable
indicator of current and intergenerational trends in people’s economic ca-
pacity, well-being, and social standing. Asset stocks, according to Deere, Al-
varado, and Twyman, are more stable and of broader composition, and they
provide a better buffer against market shocks. (7) Consider, for example, the
ways in which people might benefit from owning the two types of assets
discussed below − land and housing. Land and housing provide shelter and
security. They accommodate production for home consumption. In post-
socialist countries such as China, the introduction of user-pays principles in
the health and welfare sectors has increased the precautionary necessity
to accumulate fungible assets such as housing. (8) The creation of a real es-
tate market and privatisation of much housing stock means that housing
can earn rental income, be sold in cases of emergency, or gambled, gifted,
or willed. Houses and land can appreciate in value over time, and in urban
areas they can be used as collateral to secure loans for further investment.
Moreover, the ownership of material goods such as land and housing gen-
erates social multiplier effects. By visibly coding owners’ wealth and class
positioning, they amplify their marital prospects, political ‘voice,’ and thus
their business opportunities. (9) In short, assets protect against present want,
hedge against future risks, and produce more wealth. (10)
In capitalist economies, wealth skews income distribution, as the highest
incomes derive not from salaries and wages, but from capital appreciation,
share dividends, and rents. (11) Since the 1990s, the key contributor to income
inequality in China similarly changed from differentials in social and human
capital to unequal wealth ownership in both rural and urban areas. (12) Wealth
has grown at a much faster rate than income. Between 1995 and 2002, annual
per capita net wealth in urban areas grew three times faster than income.
Nationwide, per capita net wealth tripled between 2000 and 2011. (13) As in
other emerging markets, the ownership of tangible assets such as enterprises
and housing became the prime means of accumulating wealth. (14) In fact,
housing represents the single largest component of household and individual
wealth. (15)
The unprecedented pace and scale of urbanisation partly accounts for the
dramatic increase of personal wealth in China. Urbanisation has become a
key driver of China’s economic growth, with almost 370 million people
added to the urban population between 1990 and 2011. In all countries,
the value of farmland increases when it is re-zoned for development and
construction. In China, though, additional utility and hence exchange value
comes from the administrative reclassification of rural areas as urban in-
dustrial or residential. National laws, banks’ risk assessment procedures, and
local practices prevent villagers in most areas from leasing collectively-
owned rural land for development and construction, using land and housing
as mortgage collateral, and selling rural housing. Thus, much of this wealth
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remains “socialised.” In contrast, in urban areas land leases and housing are
fungible, in great demand, and privately owned by individuals. Thus, when
villages are encompassed by spreading cities and towns and their land is
zoned for urban development, the value of these assets increases, as does
their owners’ capacity to accumulate additional wealth.
A final point to emphasise is how the gender asset gap might affect other
aspects of gender relations. (16) Gender asset inequalities exacerbate gender
inequalities in power, agency, and functioning. Without registered and ac-
knowledged property rights, women have limited capacity to independently
manage, use, capitalise on, and dispose of their home or land. Women’s asset
ownership improves their influence and well-being within households. Con-
versely, as feminist scholars have pointed out, women’s bargaining position
in the household and their ability to escape domestic violence is weaker if
they have no property to fall back upon. (17) Even in community property
regimes, in which property acquired during the marriage is jointly owned
by the spouses, when women who are not registered as property owners
divorce, they bear higher transaction and opportunity costs in attempting
to defend their rights to marital assets. (18) Mothers’ ownership of income-
generating assets improves the welfare of other household members, as it
correlates with lower dependency ratios and higher expenditure on nutri-
tion, education, and social insurance. Further, it leads to less gender discrim-
inatory expectations and behaviours among the children from their
households.
In short, the gender asset gap matters more as China urbanises. And it
matters particularly to women. If we are to understand why it is that
women are not sharing equally in the wealth created by rural China’s urban
transformation, we first need to make sense of how property institutions
link gender and asset distributions across time, space, and rural /urban ad-
ministrative boundaries.
The gender asset gap in rural China
Comparable evidence on the gender distribution of rural land and housing is
limited. There is a high degree of inter-village variation in rules relating to col-
lective land, a low rate of certification of rural land rights and house ownership,
and no national gender-disaggregated data on rights to land and housing in
either urban or rural China. With these caveats in mind, the following overview
draws on published sources and my own fieldwork to provide descriptive sta-
tistics on the distribution of rights to administer, manage, and contract collec-
tive farmland and occupy village house sites, and house ownership.
Rural land ownership is vested in rural collective economic organisations.
In most locations, the collective owner is represented by the Village Com-
mittee. Elsewhere, it might be the sub-village small group, Village Share-
holding Corporation, or the lowest level of the state’s bureaucratic hierarchy,
the township. Here, for the sake of simplicity, I simply refer to “the village”
as owner. Villages are entitled to administer, lease, contract use rights to,
and manage income from land and other collectively-owned assets. Since
1979, village ownership and administrative rights progressively have been
separated from land management and contracted use rights. While there is
considerable variation among the entities using rural land, village households
comprise the majority of land contractors. In early rounds of contracting in
the 1980s, villages allocated farmland based on the numbers of people per
household. Every few years, they then adjusted land distribution to accom-
modate changes in household size resulting from births, deaths, marriages,
and divisions. Over the past two decades, the legal right of villages to adjust
land among households has been curtailed, while the duration of land con-
tracts has lengthened and contractors’ rights to use and profit from the land
and exchange their contract rights have been strengthened. These changes
were consolidated in the 1998 Land Management Law (hereafter, LML) and
the 2002 Rural Land Contract Law (RLCL).
There is little direct evidence of gender disparities in the administration
and management of collective assets. However, from studies of women’s
political participation in village government, we know that until 2009,
women comprised around 16 percent of the membership of Village Com-
mittees and almost one quarter of the committees included no women. (19)
Less than 1 percent of Village Committees heads and only 3 percent of Com-
munist Party members in rural areas were female. (20) Village representative
assemblies and meetings typically were attended by household heads, more
than 90 percent of whom were male. (21) Women consequently were under-
represented in the organisations and meetings that decided on collective
investments, public infrastructure construction, applications for contract
land and house sites, and the distribution of subsidies and dividends from
land revenue. Song and I found that among 208 women living on the out-
skirts of Fuzhou and Changsha, less than 4 percent of women in the first
site and 21 percent in the second had participated in a village assembly in
the 12 months prior to expropriation of their villages’ land, when critically
important questions about compensation eligibility were being settled. (22)
Following widespread criticism of women’s under-representation in village
government, in 2010 the Organic Law of Village Committees was amended
to stipulate that each Village Committee must include a woman, and one
third of village assembly representatives must be female. Yet although
women’s proportionate representation consequently increased, women
have reported little improvement in their capacity to influence the rules re-
garding collective assets. As a Zhejiang interviewee reflected:
Women don’t usually participate in any decision making. They (the
cadres) make the decisions. So I can’t tell if my “say” has changed
because I don’t have any “say.” I know there are village rules, but I
don’t know where, I don’t know when they were made, or if they’ve
been revised. I haven’t seen them. But actually, the village rules are
even more important to us than the laws! (23)
N o . 2 0 1 2 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 37
16. World Bank Development Report, Gender Equality and Development, op. cit, p.151.
17. Carmen Diana Deere and Cheryl Doss, “The Gender Asset Gap: What Do We know and Why Does
It Matter?”, art. cit.
18. Chunyan Zheng, “Lun lihun anjian zhong nongcun funü quanyi de baohu” (Theorizing the protec-
tion of rural women’s rights in divorce cases), Zhongwai qiyejia (Chinese and Foreign Entrepre-
neurs), No. 6, 2011, pp. 160-162.
19. Xiajuan Guo, Yongnian Zheng, and Yang Li, “Women’s Participation in Village Autonomy in China:
Evidence from Zhejiang,” China Quarterly, No. 197, 2009, pp. 145-164; Juan Ding, “Zhongguo
funü de zhengzhi canyu zhuangkuang” (The state of women’s political participation in China), in
Lin Tan (ed.), 1995-2005 nian: Zhongguo xingbie pingdeng yu funü fazhan baogao (1995-2005:
report on gender equality and women’s development in China), Beijing, Shehui kexue wenxian
chubanshe, 2006, pp. 52-64.
20. Jude Howell, “Women’s political participation in China: In whose interests elections?”, Journal of
Contemporary China, Vol. 15, No. 49, 2006, pp. 603-620; Xiaohong Liu and Zhiping Wu, “Funü zai
cunweihui xuanju zhong de jingxuan celüe yanjiu” (Research on women’s campaigning strategy
when participating in village elections), Funü yanjiu luncong (Collection of women’s studies), No. 1,
2008, pp. 15-20.
21. Zhen Yan (ed.), Zhongguo nongcun funü zhuangkuang diaocha (Survey on the situation of China’s
rural women), op. cit.; Yong Zhang, “Nongcun funü canyu cunweihui xuanju de xianzhuang jiqi
yingxiang yinsu” (The current situation and factors influencing rural women’s participation in vil-
lage elections), Shehui (Society), No. 6, 2004, pp. 26-29.
22. Sally Sargeson and Yu Song, “Land Expropriation and the Gender Politics of Citizenship in the
Urban Frontier,” The China Journal, no. 64, July 2010.
23. Interview, Kaihua, April 2012.
Sally Sargeson – Why Women Own Less, And Why It Matters More in Rural China’s Urban Transformation 
Clearer evidence is available on the gender gap in land contracting. In law,
policy, and custom, land use rights are conceptualised as being contracted
to households. (24) But within households, there are five significant disparities
between the entitlements of male and female household members. First,
when villages originally distributed contract land in the 1980s, although
adult men and women usually were allotted equal portions, in many regions
male children were granted double the portion allotted to girls. (25)
Second, although the names of all adult household members may be listed
on land contracts, and although women perform a great deal of farm work,
most land contracts only include men’s names. Of 414 land contracts held
by farming households in Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan, and Yunnan, I found that
less than 20 percent included women’s names. (26) Where women’s names
did appear they were either listed jointly with other family members or
there were no adult able-bodied males in the household. This was compa-
rable to the finding of the 2011 Landesa survey, in which women were listed
on only 17.1 percent of land contracts. (27) However, in Sichuan, Shaanxi,
Gansu, Ningxia, and Jiangxi, none of the 281 villagers interviewed by Li Xiao-
yun and his colleagues had included women’s names on their contracts.28
According to a woman farmer in Yunnan, contracts automatically are reg-
istered in men’s names: “It’s the women who marry in, we’re considered to
be outsiders. Men are recognised as locals, the members of village house-
holds. So the village leaders always write the men’s names. Usually they
don’t even ask us, just put everything under his name.” (29)
Third, within households, the security and scope of men’s and women’s
land contract rights differ. This gender gap is most apparent when villagers’
marital status changes. When women marry non-local men or divorce local
men, many risk being denied use of the households’ contract land. When
men’s marital status alters, however, few face the same risk. (30) A 2004 cross-
national survey by the Women’s Federation found that women made up 70
percent of landless villagers. The Third National Survey on the Status of Chi-
nese Women in 2010 found that since 2000, the percentage of landless
women had increased almost 12 points, to 21 percent. Among all landless
villagers, 27.7 percent of women had lost their use rights as a direct result
of marriage, divorce, re-marriage, or widowhood, but only 3.7 percent of
men had become landless for these reasons. (31) The expansion of markets
and recent legislative changes have further undermined married women’s
security with regard to household contract land. Escalating rates of male
out-migration and off-farm employment have led to a gendered division of
household agricultural management and production. Male land contract
signatories who work away often still decide on the use of and investments
in plots tilled by their unwaged wives and mothers. (32) The RLCL and 2007
Property Law enable land contract signatories to sell, lease, and transfer
their use rights. Hence, unless local implementation regulations explicitly
require spousal consent, most women have no legal grounds on which to
prevent men’s disposition of the contract land they farm. (33)
Fourth, compared to men, women profit less from the output and exchange
of their households’ contract land.(34) Many rural households have only one sav-
ings account, which is registered in the name of the household head. Income
from agriculture and land rent is deposited into this single account. Women
therefore rely upon the goodwill of their fathers, husbands, or sons to gain access
to savings. Despite having farmed land contracted by her husband for more
than two decades, one woman I interviewed in Yunnan commented, “I’ve never
had my own money. Really, I’m not kidding you. Not one fen of my own.” (35)
Finally, there are severe gender disparities in the distribution of rural hous-
ing. In villages that have space and planning approval for new housing, ir-
respective of the number of sons in a family, each adult son may be allo-
cated a house site. But it usually is only in households without able-bodied
sons, that one - and only one - adult daughter may receive a site. More than
90 percent of rural households own housing, yet very little rural housing is
registered in women’s names. I calculated that less than 15 percent of rural
women have title to the houses in which they lived. (36) Li Xiaoyun and his
colleagues similarly concluded that there is “serious gender inequality in
the use, construction, capital resources and distribution of houses.” (37) In
sum, the available evidence shows that there is a severe gender asset gap
in rural areas. Why does this gap occur, and how might it be altered in the
context of rural China’s urban transformation?
Narratives of gender inequality
One of the most common explanations for gender inequality is that
Confucian patriarchal traditions persist in rural areas. For example, Wang
cites the tenacity of Confucian values as the reason why villagers idealise
the patrilineal household as an indivisible property-owning, production,
and consumption unit in which men’s and women’s interests are pre-
sumed to be homogenous, even though their power, resources, and work-
load are unequal. (38) Within the household, Chen argues, men’s household
headship and gender divisions of labour are legitimated every day in pa-
triarchal maxims such as “husbands are superior, wives subordinate,”
“men manage outside, women manage inside,” and – with regard to the
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orthodox custom of virilocal post-marital settlement – “women follow
men.” (39)
This narrative illuminates the ideological framing of gender in China. How-
ever, it hinges on a classic a-historical othering manoeuvre that Fabian de-
scribes as a “denial of coevalness.” (40) At its core is a discursive temporal/spatial
opposition between what are depicted as the primordial traditions of a “back-
ward,” culturally inert countryside and the dynamic cultures of modern ur-
banism. Implicit in this opposition is the premise: modernise the village, bring
it into the urban space of the twenty-first century, and Confucian patriarchy
will weaken. Yet the disjuncture between city and countryside has blurred as
a result of industrialisation, urbanisation, the expansion of high-speed trans-
port and communications infrastructure, and mass rural-urban labour migra-
tion. Villagers, in many respects, already share the same territorial horizons,
legal framework, cultural practices, work routines, and commercialised desires
as urbanites. This begs explanation of the mechanisms perpetuating Confucian
patriarchal values in a mobile, rapidly urbanising society.
A second explanatory narrative is predicated on another progressivist as-
sumption, one that is common to both Marxist emancipatory theory and
the individualistic off-shoot of liberal economics: human capital theory. Since
the 1950s, Engels’ dictum that women’s entry into the paid workforce would
improve their status has informed interventions by China’s government and
Women’s Federation to mobilise women as workers. Moreover, the govern-
ment still claims that women earn less than men primarily because of resid-
ual gender gaps in education, training, and employment. The implication is
that women who acquire education and skills will prosper. A similar assump-
tion underpins a recent World Bank study on poverty in China, which con-
cludes that as labour market competition intensifies, income and wealth
inequalities increasingly will reflect variations in human capital. (41)
This explanation is not supported by the available evidence. Despite a re-
duction in differentials between male and female education and training,
and despite women’s high rate of participation in paid employment, the
gender gaps in both income and assets have increased over recent years.
The rate of increase has been greater in wealthier provinces where labour
markets are most developed. (42) To the extent that asset distribution does
not reflect disparities in individuals’ human capital endowments, but rather
gender categories, this narrative fails to explain these gaps. Aside from fac-
tual inaccuracy, another problem with this narrative is that it is deployed
to encourage women to compete in education and factor markets whilst
discouraging inquiry into the reasons for the disconnect between human
capital, earnings, and wealth in those markets.
A residualist view of institutions is central to the third most widely pur-
veyed narrative. Here, gender inequality is explained as the result of dis-
junctures between old collectivist institutions, transitional regulations
intended to secure the conditions for rural household commodity produc-
tion, and recent laws aimed at empowering individual property holders in
factor markets. Liaw, for example, argues that the insecurity of rural
women’s property derives partly from shortcomings and contradictions in
the RLCL, Property Law, and revised Marriage Law of 2001. (43) Although Ar-
ticle 30 of the RLCL stipulated that women who marry virilocally retain
rights in their natal households’ contract land unless the village into which
they marry allots them a plot, its prohibition against villages’ adjustment
of land among households negated the mechanism providing in-marrying
women with farmland. (44) Revisions to the Marriage Law changed the marital
regime from full community property (in which assets acquired both before
and during the marriage are jointly owned by spouses) to partial community
property (only assets acquired during the marriage are jointly owned; assets
acquired prior to marriage remain individual property). Thus, women mar-
rying into households with 30-year land contracts and houses lost their
rights in marital land or housing. Even if women subsequently receive land
in readjustments, or newly-weds jointly re-contract land, women remain
vulnerable to dispossession in the case of marital breakdown because nei-
ther the RLCL nor Property Law explicitly define land contracts as “jointly
owned” property. This precludes the partitioning of contract land in the
event of divorce. In addition to the gender blindness of national legislation,
the implementation of village “self-government” has allowed gender-dis-
criminatory customs to be formalised as village rules. It was her recognition
of this fact that prompted the Zhejiang interviewee quoted above to re-
mark, “Actually, the village rules are even more important to us than the
laws!” Like the arguments outlined above, the implication is that legislative
and policy reform will remove gender inequalities. What remains unex-
plained is why, in recent changes to both law and customary rules, women
consistently have lost out.
Each of these narratives offers insight into factors contributing to the gen-
der asset gap. Ultimately, however, each contains a problematic teleological
assumption: when villagers modernise, or when women are employed, or
when regulatory institutions are updated and made consistent, gender in-
equalities should disappear. So, too, should the gender asset gap. In light of
the evidence reviewed above, these assumptions seem misguided. To con-
struct a more credible explanation, we need to refer to a non-teleological
relational theory that will assist us in identifying dynamics reproducing the
gender asset gap in the course of urban transformation.
Charles Tilly’s theory of categorical sources of durable inequality offers a
useful corrective to explanations of why China’s women own less. Although
Tilly did not focus on China, and indeed his work has influenced compara-
tively little scholarship on inequality in China, (45) his argument grew precisely
from his critique of the types of a-historical, individualist accounts of in-
equality that are outlined above. For Tilly, binary relational categories are a
central organising feature of all societies. The gist of his theory of how these
categories give rise to and sustain inequalities is articulated in succinct
statements in two key publications: “Durable inequality among categories
arises because people who control access to value-producing resources solve
pressing organizational problems by means of categorical distinctions. In-
advertently or otherwise, those people set up systems of social closure, ex-
clusion and control. Multiple parties – not all of them powerful, some of
them even victims of exploitation – then acquire stakes in those solu-
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tions.” (46) “[E]xterior categories … such as gender… become interior to the
extent that members of organizations create widely recognized names for
the boundaries and actors, enact defining rituals, and represent the cate-
gories by symbolically explicit devices.” (47) Inequalities between the cate-
gories are not only entrenched, but also will be magnified when “repeated
transactions across the boundary (a) regularly yield net advantages to those
on one side and (b) reproduce the boundary.” (48) This suggests that when a
dominant category owns most assets, and controls the decision-making or-
ganisations and rules distributing assets, it will reinvest part of the surplus
it receives through opportunity hoarding and exploitation in reinforcing the
boundaries between it and the other category. (49)
Before applying Tilly’s argument to empirically examine how gender dis-
tributive inequalities are produced in urbanising China, it is worth briefly
comparing his view with two other influential theoretical approaches. Scep-
tics have questioned how Tilly’s theory differs from the institutionalist con-
cept of “path dependence.” (50) For Tilly, cultural scripts matter, but they are
of second order causal importance compared to the agency that relationally
categorised people exercise. Thus, whereas the high level of determinism
implicit in the concept of “path dependency” makes it difficult to explain
change, (51) in Tilly’s schema, actors make and remake institutions. Moreover,
whereas scholars of “path dependency” largely have overlooked the links
between gender, institutions, and distribution, (52) for Tilly gender is a funda-
mental category that structures organisations, and which those organisa-
tions routinely reproduce in their rules, roles, and transactions. Marxists, on
the other hand, have questioned how the mechanisms through which Tilly’s
categories sustain inequality differ from class relations. As Erik Olin Wright
points out, the originality of his argument is precisely that it extends a ma-
terialist analysis to patterns of categorical inequality overlooked by Marx. (53)
For scholars interested in the gender consequences of rural China’s momen-
tous urban transformation, Tilly’s argument provides a useful lens through
which to analyse how organisations utilise discourses, rules, and practices
attached to gender categories to enable men to acquire and exploit the
value that urbanisation adds to their assets. It is to this task that I now turn.
Reinforcing gender categories, redistributing
assets in rural China’s urban transformation
When rural collectively-owned land is expropriated by local governments
and villagers’ housing, agricultural, and business assets are demolished to
make way for urban development, most compensation is paid to the rural
collective economic organisation that represents the collective owners of the
land. Typically, this is the Village Committee. Compensation predominantly is
monetary, but might also include provision for villagers’ relocation in urban
settings, vocational training, and employment assistance, and inclusion in
local pension and insurance funds. By tracing the distribution of compensa-
tion, registration, and use of new assets and organisation of work and social
reproduction in urban areas, we gain insights into how local governments,
households, and Village Committees instrumentalise gender to solve the dis-
tributional challenges posed by urban expansion. I follow this path in reverse,
starting with the male-dominated organisations that govern villages.
After deducting a percentage of the compensation for future collective
economic ventures and, often, for embezzlement by the village leaders, Vil-
lage Committees then redistribute the remaining compensation among el-
igible households and individual villagers. The Committees seek to maximise
the amount made available to each villager - and so reduce the likelihood
they will suspect and protest against embezzlement - by limiting the po-
tential number of claimants. In peri-urban sites in Zhejiang, Yunnan, Hunan,
and Fujian, one common way this is achieved is by using gender and virilocal
marriage customs as the basis for determining village membership and con-
sequent eligibility for compensation. Village rules typically grant local men
entitlements to a full share of compensation for expropriated assets as a
patrilineal birthright. But under the same rules, local women are considered
to be village members only until such time as they marry. After marriage,
their membership status, and their entitlement to compensation for any
expropriated assets, is determined by their husbands’ status. Women mar-
ried to non-local men are thereby deemed to be ineligible for a share of
compensation. Some villages even anticipate the impending “out-marriage”
of unwed girls in the village by apportioning them only half the compensa-
tion sum given to their brothers. It is not only local men, but also their
mothers and wives long accepted as village members that have a stake in
supporting the use of gender and virilocal custom as a just basis for the dis-
tribution of compensation. By excluding or giving less to women who are
unwed, out-married, in de-facto relationships, and divorced, men and the
women affiliated to them gain more.
Village Committees’ methods of transferring monetary compensation also
favour men. Although rural women disproportionately are disadvantaged
by the elimination of farming livelihoods and home-based businesses, in
the four provinces in which I conducted research approximately 20 percent
of women farmers never received any monetary compensation for the loss
of their livelihoods. (54) This was either because they were deemed ineligible
for compensation, or because their share of compensation was paid to
someone else: usually, the male household head. In all, monetary compen-
sation for all members was pooled and paid into the bank account of the
household head in 65 percent of households. Payments into men’s bank ac-
counts reinforce their normative status and financial clout as household
heads. As one interviewee explained, “It is natural for men to support
women, but if a woman supports a man people will look down on him.” (55)
Moreover, some Committees pay men an extra premium, and so give them
“face” as family “breadwinners.” In areas around Changsha, in Hunan, Song
and I found that villages’ decisions to grant the maximum possible sum of
monetary compensation to men aged 23 to 50, but to women aged from
only 25 to 40, effectively ensured that men received several hundred thou-
sand yuan more from each village’s pool of compensation. The welfare of
their elderly parents, as well as wives, thereby became contingent on their
maintenance of good relations with the household head: “If the son was
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married, the village government naturally paid him for the household. So
some parents missed out. If they got along with their son they’d live with
him. But if they didn’t get on with their son they had to make their own
living. The government refused to care for them.” (56)
In situations where compensation “naturally” becomes the property of men
by virtue of their gender and the rights and roles attached to it, women will
rationally attempt to secure a share of compensation by similarly conforming
to the roles attached to their gender in patrilineal, male-headed households.
Women of all ages anchor their property entitlements in their performance
as agreeable, or at least dutiful, mothers, wives, and daughters. Citing the old
adage, “Men manage outside, and women manage inside,” and playing up
presumptions about women’s risk-averse, caring nature, they argue that hus-
bands should turn the households’ compensation over to them for saving,
investment in children’s education, and the care of aging parents. Women
who fail to conform to female gendered roles or who contest village rules
are chastised for their cultural ignorance and questionable morality.
The small percentage of women courageous enough to appeal to govern-
ments to protect their legal entitlement to a share of compensation irre-
spective of their marital status risk not only social ostracism from their
community, but also the rejection of their claims by local government au-
thorities, who find it politically expedient to placate village men angered by
the paltry compensation sums that the governments have paid for land tak-
ing. In other words, governments are complicit in the reproduction of the
gender asset gap. Officials justify their refusal to overturn gender discrimi-
natory village rules by arguing, first, that the Organic Law entitles villages to
apply customary rules to exclude opportunistic claimants so that “genuine”
villagers (i.e., the members of patrilineal households) receive adequate com-
pensation. Second, by criticising the “self-interested” motives of women pro-
testers, they reinforce normative expectations that good wives behave
altruistically with regard to assets. As one community official complained:
We’ve had two go to Beijing, petitioning. One, from Zhejiang, she’d
already been married into several places. Then she married a man
here, but she didn’t care for him. All she was interested in was getting
her hands on some property, village benefits. But the village, it said
only after three full years would she get anything. So she went to
Beijing and petitioned, and the government gave her more than one
thousand – even we officials don’t get a thousand – a dibao (57) pay-
ment of one thousand three hundred! But oh no, that wasn’t enough.
She still went on petitioning, because although the village gave her
somewhere to live, she even wanted her own house! (58)
Major new assets such as urban apartments, and investments in small
businesses, properties, shares, and interest-bearing deposits were predomi-
nantly registered in men’s names. For example, among 343 households re-
located to new urban residences in Zhejiang, Yunnan, Hunan, and Fujian, I
found that only 71 registered women’s names on the house titles. In con-
trast, the 2010 Survey on the Status of Chinese Women reported that in its
sample (comprising 52.5 percent urban and 47.6 percent rural people), 37.9
percent of women “owned” housing. Unfortunately, the published report
does not explain whether all these women had registered title to housing.
But amongst married couples, it notes that 51.7 percent of men and 13.2
percent of women held sole title to their houses. (59) This suggests two things:
first, there is significant gender inequality in the ownership of the single
largest component of urban families’ wealth; second, while married men
usually own homes as individuals, most women achieve ownership as wives,
via community property. As explained above, many would have difficulty
defending their property in the event of divorce.
The gender-unequal distribution of compensation and new housing gives
men indisputable advantages in capitalising on new opportunities in the
urban economy. Asked which family members decide how to use compen-
sation funds, one interviewee scoffed, “Men very rarely allow a woman to
decide something important. You only need one hand to count the number
of households in which a woman is the decision-maker!” (60) Without either
monetary compensation or title to housing, most women lack the collateral
to secure loans from formal financial organisations in the city. A small mi-
nority uses their home-owning husbands as proxy borrowers and licensees
to establish small businesses. For example, in the highly entrepreneurial dis-
trict of Xiuzhou, Ningbo, in 2004 only 80 women but several hundred of
the men among the 20,000 landless villagers there had established busi-
nesses. Even among long-term urban residents, Zhang and Pan found that
men had greater access to start-up capital and business assets. (61) Over time,
wives’ capital dependence and domestic work burden tends to undermine
their control over the businesses, relative to their husbands. The expenditure
of compensation, income, and profits on masculinist, social capital-enhanc-
ing rituals such as banqueting further entrenches the gender gap in family
businesses. Thus, the gender categories utilised by Village Committees and
governments to legitimate unequal wealth distributions among the men
and women caught up in rural China’s urban transformation become impli-
cated in the gendering of urban entrepreneurship.
As Tilly’s theory would predict, urban governments have constructed gen-
der differentiated employment and pension systems that facilitate the ex-
ploitation of women’s labour. Former women farmers are enlisted to work
in urban enterprises, neighbourhood management, and the voluntary care
sector. Ideologically, this is in keeping with the Chinese government’s argu-
ment that increasing women’s employment will reduce gender inequality.
Yet the strategies implemented by local authorities actually exacerbate gen-
der income inequality, whilst maintaining China’s price competitiveness in
global commodity production chains. Women are directed into labour-in-
tensive electronics, toys, clothing, and footwear manufacture, domestic
service and sanitation, and home-based assembly work – sectors notorious
not only for low pay, but also for poor protection of workers’ rights and
safety. Those who choose unemployment to unwaged work are criticised,
in terms that combine old notions of socialist-productivist morality and a
liberal-individualist interpretation of feminism, as “not contributing to so-
ciety,” of having “poor quality,” and “free-loading.” Men are trained and en-
couraged to work as enterprise technicians, in the more highly remunerated
sectors of transport and construction, or to establish small businesses. While
men are expected to continue working until they reach 60, women typically
become eligible to draw pensions five to ten years earlier than men. Men
thus accumulate larger pension funds than women. This is justified, accord-
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ing to official interviewees, because it “frees up” – and obligates – middle-
aged women to perform voluntary community service and care work. But
it also encourages households to try to protect men’s earnings by buying
them commercial medical, unemployment, and old age insurance.
What are the women to do? Asked how women occupy themselves during
their many years of retirement, an official in Quzhou, Zhejiang, voiced the
common expectation that “older women can make a contribution as vol-
unteers, cleaning the neighbourhood.” (62) Women’s participation in neigh-
bourhood beautification and home renovation projects maintain the value
of real estate owned by local governments, business people, and household
heads. Others insisted that women like to retire early so they can care for
their parents-in-law and grandchildren. Making community service and care
work the primary function of women reinforces the normative conflation
of wife and inside/domesticity which is implicit in the Chinese term “neiren.”
But as Song and I have written elsewhere, some officials represent govern-
ments’ land-taking as a process positively reinforcing village women’s as-
similation into “modern” urban gender roles:
As the community becomes more urbanised, they start dressing up
like us urbanites. This really brings them a lot of benefits. So when
we have meetings with them, we remind them, “You should remem-
ber what advantages the state has brought you! Say you still lived in
the village, were still a rural woman, how could you be choosing
skirts, looking at pictures, making up your faces so beautifully, and
have money in your hands the way you do now? (63)
In addressing the distributional problems that arise in the context of urban
expansion, male-dominated Village Committees, patrilineally defined house-
holds, and governments instrumentalise gender as a fundamental category
to implement and justify gender-unequal distribution and exploitation.
Monetary compensation disproportionately is paid to men, and the more
valuable, institutionally secure real estate and businesses acquired by former
villagers in urban areas are predominantly registered in men’s names. Re-
turns from men’s assets are reinvested in gender-defining roles, rituals, and
symbols. At the same time, governments’ employment and welfare inter-
ventions help to make former rural women’s labour available at low cost, if
not for free, to urban businesses and male-headed households. Adding to
the impact of the gender asset gap, women are encouraged to interiorise
market-rational values from a gender relational standpoint, in ways that
constrain their subjectivity and agency with respect to assets.
Conclusions
The question of why women own less in urbanising China is not satisfac-
torily answered by the most widely circulated arguments. Contrary to the
teleological assumptions apparent in those arguments, urbanisation actually
perpetuates the gender asset gap. Drawing on Charles Tilly’s theory of how
categories are used to reinforce and reproduce inequalities, this article of-
fered a different account of the asset gap. Empirically, it illustrated how gen-
der categories are instrumentalised in Village Committees’ definitions of
village membership and compensation eligibility and methods of compen-
sation payment, households’ registration of new housing, business and in-
surance assets, and governments’ employment strategies and welfare
programs. The asset gap, in turn, sustains gender relations of opportunity
hoarding and exploitation. While former village men accumulate value-pro-
ducing property in the new urban space, most women are incorporated into
urban economies and societies as propertyless, feminised workers in, unpaid
domestic caretakers of, and dependents on assets owned largely by men.
Gender is a key axis of asset distribution and role allocation in rural China’s
urban transformation.
What are the implications of this argument for gender relations, as China
urbanises?
The material implications seem inevitable: Wealth inequalities between
men and women will increase rather than decline in the medium term. In
this event, gender inequalities in income are unlikely to narrow, regardless
of improvements in women’s human capital endowment and employment
participation.
The repercussions of this argument for changes in women’s subjectivity
and agency are, in some ways, more troubling. The question of who owns
assets goes to the heart of our understandings of who are the active agents
of modernity. For liberal economists, the active agent of the market econ-
omy is presumed to be a rational, autonomous wealth maximiser. This pre-
sumption has informed calls for Chinese land contract rights to be
transformed into individual ownership in order to increase farmers’ incen-
tives to invest – despite the fact that in most households, land contractors
and farmers are of different sexes and are motivated by different incentive
structures. Similarly, in the classic imaginary of Madisonian democracy, it is
partly in order to protect its property that the (male) majority is motivated
to resist oppression and arbitrary extraction. Of course, many dispute the
methodological individualist ontology underpinning liberal presumptions.
But the logical extension of this thinking, as it is being applied in institutional
and policy reforms, is that men and women are being manoeuvred into dif-
ferent modes of behaviour, with propertied men acting as economic and
political principals, and women serving as their dependent, domesticated
agents. Asset distribution is circumscribing the subject positions and dimen-
sions of agency available to women affected by urban growth.
Finally, this argument also has relevance for the Chinese government’s
credibility with regard to its long-standing commitment to support women’s
equality. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China’s leaders
have been promoting what they anticipate to be a virtuous circle of urban-
isation, capital investment, and economic structural transformation, and
improvements to the populations’ wealth and well-being. But unless action
is taken to define, register, and enforce women’s ownership of assets in each
turn of this policy circle, the wealth generated will be unequally distributed
between gender categories. In that event, the Chinese government will have
failed to fulfil one of its core social justice commitments.
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